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gretted, because (a) in the interests of the public it is desirable that
public service vehicles be more strictly regulated than private ve-
hicles ;20 (b) under the general law applicable to all automobile drivers
alike, it is possible for injured parties to be entirely unable to collect
amounts awarded by any judgments for "first offenses" rendered
against operators of for-hire vehicles ;21 (c) in view of the corporate
surety's greater responsibility, and of the power of the creditor to sue
such surety directly, the desireability of corporate over individual sure-
ties is recognized in business and law.22  JoE L. CARLToN.
Contracts Induced by Fraud-Election of Remedies in Noth
Carolina.
A plaintiff who has been induced to enter a contract through fraud
of the defendant is faced with the perplexing problem of making a choice
of remedies. From the point of view of selection of rights he may affirm
the contract or may rescind. If he chooses the former, his remedy is
an action on the contract or an action for deceit. But if he chooses the
latter, his remedy is to seek a restoration of the status quo, by bringing
a bill for rescission or suing at law on the basis of a complete rescission.1
Thus, the plaintiff is faced with a choice between two inconsistent po-
sitions in regard to his substantive rights. In practical effect this usually
means an election between the two remedies already mentioned. To this
situation is applied the much discussed doctrine of election of rem-
edies with the result that the choice of one among inconsistent remedies
bars recourse to others.2 It has been pointed out8 that the historical
evolution of this doctrine has proceeded in at least three stages: first,
a period in which the doctrine was applied for the recognized purpose
of preventing a double satisfaction; second, a period in which the doc-
trine was cast in terms of formal logic and its real purpose overlooked
in the following of logical consistencies; and third, a period in which, it
being recognized that logical consistency as an end in itself often led
'See: Eastern Ohio Transportation Corp. v. Village of Bridgeport, 44 Ohio
App. 433, 185 N. E. 891 (1932) ; Notes 10 and 14 supra.
'Comment, (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 384; see note 4, .supra.
Lutz v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978 (E. D. La. 1916) ; NATIONAL BAN urarCY
AcT, §50, Bonds of trustees and referees: 30 STAr. 558 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §78
(1927).
'Day v. Broyles, 222 Ala. 508, 133 So. 269 (1931) ; Fields v. Brown, 160 N. C.
295, 76 S. E. 8 (1912) (If rescission does not restore the status quo, damages may
be a cumulative and not an inconsistent remedy).
'United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 100, 67 L. ed.
261 (1922); Gutterman v. Gally, 131 Cal. App. 647, 21 Pac. (2d) 1000 (1933);
Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 341; Hines,
Election of Remedies, A Criticism (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 707.
'Note (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 593.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to exceedingly undesirable results,4 the courts sought escape in excep-
tions and qualifications.5
The exact status of the doctrine in North Cirolina is not entirely
clear, but apparently it is still in the second stage of the development
outlined above, still flourishing in all the strength of a strictly logical
application. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the case of
Stewart v. Salisbury Realty Co.6 In that case the defrauded vendee of
a land contract, upon discovering the fraud, attempted to rescind by
tendering a deed, which was refused by the vendor. Subsequently the
vendee brought an action for deceit. The court, per Brown, J., held that
a mere tender of rescission bars a later action for deceit. In reaching
this extreme result the court went even further than was absolutely
necessary for logical consistency.1 Other manifestations of the strict
doctrine in North Carolina are: (1) the bringing of an action on the the-
ory that title has passed will bar a subsequent action on a theory that
title has not passed ;8 and (2) a plaintiff may not in one complaint join
an action for rescission with an action for breach of contract.9 Of
course, even under a strict application of the doctrine, for the assertion
of one remedy to constitute a bar to another remedy, the two remedies
must be inconsistent.' 0 Thus, a defrauded vendor's action for the pur-
chase price does not bar his later action for deceit, as both proceed upon
an affirmance of the contract."1
'A defrauded plaintiff, having prosecuted his bill for rescission to an unsucess-
ful close, was thereafter denied the right to sue for deceit. The result is that
the guilty party goes unscathed with the fruits of his fraud. United States v.
Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 100, 67 L. ed. 261 (1922).
'Abbadessa v. Puglisi, 101 Conn. 1, 124 Atl. 838 (1924); Schenck v. State
Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924) (mistaken pursuit of a
non-existent remedy is not an irrevocable election).
I Stewart v. Salisbury Realty and Insurance Co., 159 N. C. 230, 74 S. E.
736 (1913).
' Rescission is bilateral; therefore, an attempted rescission by one party
not accepted by the other is not inconsistent with continued existence of the
contract and so should not bar a later action for deceit. But affirmance is unilateral;
therefore, a prior action for deceit is a bar to a subsequent action for rescission.
Cohoon v. Fisher, 146 Ind. 583, 45 N. E. 787 (1897) ; Gorman-Head Auto Co. v.
Barrett, 78 Okla. 34, 188 Pac. 1083 (1920); Hines, Election of Remedies, A
Criticism (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 707, 712. But some liberal courts hold a prior
action for deceit a conditional affirmance only, contingent on a recovery of dam-
ages. Smith v. Bricker, 86 Iowa 285, 53 N. W. 250 (1892); Schenck v. State
Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924).
'Davis v. Butters Lumber Co., 132 N. C. 233, 43 S. E. 650 (1903) ; Lanier v.
Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200, 98 S. E. 593 (1919).
'Lykes v. Grove, 201 N. C. 254, 159 S. E. 360 (1931) (although no action
for deceit involved here, the problem is the same since one action proceeds on an
affirmance and the other on a disaffirmance of the contract). Contra: Glover v.
Radford., 120 Mich. 528, 79 N. W. 803 (1899).
Fleming v. Congleton, 177 N. C. 186, 98 S. E. 449 (1919) ; Irvin v. Harris,
182 N. C. 647, 109 S. E. 867 (1921).
" Standand Sewing Machine Co. v. Owings, 14( N. C. 503, 53 S. E. 345
(1906) (satisfaction of first judgment unsuccessful because of defendant's super-
vening bankruptcy) ; Bare v. Thacker, 190 N. C. 499, 130 S. E. 164 (1925).
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On the other hand there are at least two North Carolina cases which
differ radically from the result reached by a strict application of the
doctrine. While it is true that in neither of these cases did the court
expressly consider thQ doctrine, the problem was present on the facts
and necessarily involved in the holding. In the case of Pettijohn v. Wil-
liams,12 the court, per Pearson, J., allowed a bill for rescission even
after judgment had been recovered in the action for deceit, double recov-
ery being prevented by an injunction against further proceedings in the
law action pending the proceedings for rescission. Also, in Troxler v.
Building Co.13 the court was little worried by the technical inconsistency
of the plaintiff's double-barreled request in the same complaint for dam-
ages for deceit and for rescission, even sending appropriate issues on
both counts to the jury, though, of course, a recovery would finally be
permitted on but one.
It is a commentary on the value of a strict application of the doc-
trine that the ultimate results obtained by these last two cases, in which
it was not applied, seem far preferable to the results of those cases in
which it was strictly applied. Furthermore, the problem which the
doctrine was originally invoked to meet, i.e., prevention of a double
satisfaction, was adequately met in these cases. Therefore, unless there
has been a decision adverse to the plaintiff in the first action on the ques-
tion of fraud, thus constituting res adjudicata,'4 or unless the bringing
of the first action has led to such a material change of position on the
part of the defendant as to constitute an estoppel,15 it would seem the
doctrine has little to recommend itself except mere compliance with
formal logic.
F. M. PARKER.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Declarations of
Present Bodily Feelings.
Plaintiff filed a claim before the North Carolina Industrial Com-
mission for compensation, contending that the death of her husband
resulted from an accident arising out of his employment by defendant
"Pettijohn v. Williams, 55 N. C. 302 (1855) (Although speaking of an
"election of remedies," the court is here considering an election between legal
and equitable remedies rather than an election between affirmance and disaffirmance
of a voidable transaction).
" Troxler v. Building Co., 137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58 (1904). This case seems
to be contrary to the more recent case of Lykes v. Grove., 201 N. C. 254, 159 S. E.
360 (1931), cited note 9, supra.
" Gutheil v. Goodrich, 160 Ind. 92, 66 N. E. 446 (1903). In some jurisdictions
a prior suit to rescind is a final election only when it is res judicata on the
merits of the subsequent action in deceit. Kramer v. Association of Almond
Growers, 111 Cal. App. 595, 295 Pac. 873 (1931); Dooley v. Crabtree, 134 Iowa 465,
109 N. W. 889 (1907).
"Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 665.
